Wednesday, 1 October 2014

Northern Territory shonkey Magistrate

Another dodgy Magistrate exposed!!!!

Royal commission: NT magistrate Michael Carey admits recommendation to drop court action against sex offender did not meet guidelines

Updated
A Northern Territory magistrate has admitted a recommendation he made in 2002 to drop court action against sex offender Don Henderson was made quickly, and did not meet guidelines.
At the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, the NT's Acting Chief Magistrate Michael Carey gave evidence about a memo he sent in 2002 when he worked at the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).
The memo sent to the DPP recommends dropping court action against Mr Henderson, a convicted sex offender who the royal commission has heard molested several children who were housed at the Retta Dixon home in Darwin.
The note from Mr Carey in 2002 has been described as "pivotal" to the decision to drop action against Mr Henderson, who was never prosecuted for his alleged crimes while working as a house parent at Retta Dixon.
Under questioning from Counsel Assisting the Commission, Sophie David, Mr Carey agreed the memo failed to adhere to prosecutor guidelines.
He admitted the memo did not, as it was supposed to, include reference or analysis to an application for new trials for Mr Henderson, and nor did it include references to Mr Henderson's history as a sex offender.
The memo also did not include the views of the officer in charge or victims, as guidelines direct.
"You would agree that this memorandum does not comply with the the prosecutor guidelines in respect of what should be in a discontinuance report?" Ms David asked.
"Yes," Mr Carey said.
Mr Carey also admitted the decision in 2002 was made within 24 hours of getting the file on Mr Henderson.
"I don't know why it was done in such haste," Mr Carey said.
Mr Henderson has been linked to scores of child abuse allegations, documents tendered to the commission show.
In 1984 he was convicted of molesting two boys at a public swimming pool in Darwin.

Apology from ministry in charge at Retta Dixon

Reverend Trevor Leggott, the head of the ministry that cared for children at Retta Dixon, has apologised for the sexual and physical abuse they suffered, but said his group could not offer money to victims.
"To hear those stories related to the people that I would call family has been extremely painful for me to hear and that is why I offer the most sincere apologies," Reverend Leggott said.
Reverend Leggott is the general-director of Australian Indigenous Ministry (AIM), whose forerunner, the Aboriginal Inland Mission, ran the Retta Dixon home.
The facility housed mainly Aboriginal children between 1946 and 1980.
I know the hurt that has been caused to these people is not going to be fixed by money.
Reverend Trevor Leggott, head of Australian Indigenous Ministries

Last week the inquiry heard often graphic accounts from nine former Retta Dixon residents who suffered physical or sexual abuse, including numerous examples of alleged abuse by Mr Henderson.
Reverend Leggott said his ministry lived a "hand-to-mouth existence" and did not have the funds available to give compensation payments to victims of abuse at Retta Dixon.
"It seems extremely difficult for me that we can offer it," he told the royal commission.
"I know there can be recompense in terms of money, but I know the hurt that has been caused to these people is not going to be fixed by money," he said.

Ministry has 'substantial number of properties'

Under questioning from Ms David, Reverend Leggott admitted his organisation did own a substantial number of properties in New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory.
But he said most of the properties were held by trusts and local churches - AIM did not own them.
He said the ministry did own some properties itself, including an office in Humpty Doo and a home in the Blue Mountains in NSW, so there was some capacity to set up a compensation scheme.
"Only if we were to realise those assets and that meant that we couldn't do the work that we are doing presently," he said.
To heckles from the public gallery at the Darwin Supreme Court, Reverend Leggott also testified he did know of any abuse at Retta Dixon until he received papers from the royal commission.

Standard of kinship care for Indigenous children 'relaxed'

Earlier the royal commission heard Indigenous children looked after by relatives in the Northern Territory do not recieve the same standard of care as children placed with other carers.
NT Children's Commissioner Howard Bath told the inquiry he generally backed a policy of putting Aboriginal children in need of care with relatives, and if that is not possible then into care with people of the same culture.

Despite that principle the inquiry heard that the NT had the lowest placement rate for Aboriginal children with Aboriginal carers in Australia.
Dr Bath said that standards of care in general were lower with kinship carers.
"There are some ways to go before you can say the standard of care offered to those kids, and I am talking generally, is the same as for all other kids that need protection," Dr Bath said.
He said in some very remote communities the disadvantaged circumstances meant it was practically much harder to find a suitable placements and because of the larger size of Aboriginal families, often there were fewer adults able to look after children.
"The reality is some of those standards tend to be relaxed," he said.
"Some of the data that we provided say five years ago showed very clearly that more of the kinship carers weren't registered as carers and more of them had difficulty in terms of receiving training for example, were less likely to recieve training that non-kinship carers."
Asked why the policy of putting Indigenous children into the care of relatives was seen as preferable, Dr Bath said it helped preserve a sense of identity for the child and helped address the "historic mistakes of the past".
He said being with someone of the same cultural background also helped protect a child against the trauma and dislocation after they are removed from their family.

Freedom of Expression and the First Amendment
A Texas court has thrown out a law prohibiting ‘up the skirt’ photography, on the grounds the previous ruling violated Texas’ citizens’ constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Another Law that America is using for other purposes other than what it was meant for!!! It is also a case where the press stirred up paranoia without reporting the facts orectly. The Media reports it is the upskirt Law. This is totally shit!!!!
Clearly no violation here just media trying to fuck every stupid American over!!!
Listen to the court before the Media!!!!


The Texas Court of Appeals ruled 8-1 to strike down part of a law which bans taking images of another person in public without their consent and with the intention to “arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person”, criticising the “paternalistic” intrusion into peoples’ private right to be aroused.
Debjani Roy, deputy director of Hollaback!, a New York-based anti-street harassment group, speaking to the Guardian, claimed the decision was “a huge violation and absolutely appalling that the rights of predators are being valued over the rights of women and girls.”
Halie Ricketts, a victim of an ‘up the skirt’ shot in an Austin mall earlier this year, commented: “Currently the law is protecting the criminals and not the victims”.
The individual, who Ms Ricketts claims stuck a camera up her skirt and took a photograph, has not been charged.
The judges’ decision, released on Wednesday, said “photographs and visual recordings are inherently expressive”, as is the process creating them, ensuring their protection under the First Amendment.
Presiding judge Sharon Keller explained: “Protecting someone who appears in public from being the object of sexual thoughts seems to be the sort of ‘paternalistic interest in regulating the defendants mind’ the First Amendment was designed to guard against.”
The ruling stemmed from the arrest of a man in his 50s named Ronald Thompson, who was stopped by police officers alerted by concerned parents in SeaWorld, San Antonio in 2011. Officers later found 73 images of children in swimsuits after confiscating his camera.
The prosecution said lawbreakers could not hide behind a freedom of speech defence, claiming photography was a technical process not covered by a constitutional right.
However, lawyers for Mr Thompson argued the above-mentioned law was “the stuff of Orwellian ‘thought-crime’”.
They claimed the legislation failed to distinguish between ‘up the skirt’ photography and taking an image of a girl walking down the street – suggesting it could be used to criminalise paparazzi photojournalists.
Mr Thompson was indicted by a grand jury on 26 felony counts of improper photography.
Freedom of expression Criminal Court Appeal Texas
This man was at a swimming pool taking underwater shots. The "thought police " said he was a pervert. Clearly he was not!!!
This is another example of one law being used for some other purpose other than what it was meant for!!!

In re Thompson

Justia.com Opinion Summary: Appellant was charged with twenty-six counts of improper photography or visual recording. Each count of the indictment alleged appellant, “with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of THE DEFENDANT, did by electronic means record another . . . at a location that was not a bathroom or private dressing room.” Each count further specified the name of an “.avi” file that was recorded. Some of the counts contained additional information regarding the subject matter and location of the recording. Appellant filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that the statute on which his prosecution was based was facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. The trial court denied the application, and appellant appealed. The “improper photography or visual recording” statute makes it a crime to, among other things, photograph or record by electronic means a visual image of another person under certain circumstances. Subsection (b)(1) of the statute makes such acts a crime if: (1) the person being photographed or recorded is not in a bathroom or private dressing room; (2) the photograph or recording of the person is made without that person’s consent; and (3) the photograph or recording is made with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, to the extent that it proscribed taking photographs and recording visual images, Subsection (b)(1) of the statute was facially unconstitutional in violation of the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Tuesday, 2 September 2014

Ex-magistrate Peter Maley offered information for $10k political donation to CLP: NT Labor

Updated 
The Northern Territory Opposition has used parliamentary privilege to raise allegations that former magistrate Peter Maley offered access to sensitive government documents in exchange for a $10,000 donation to the Country Liberal Party in 2008.
Shadow Attorney-General Michael Gunner tabled and read from emails sent by Norm McCleary, a West Australian mining explorer, to Chief Minister Adam Giles in May this year that allege the offer was made on behalf of former deputy chief minister Dave Tollner, the Member for Fong Lim.
Mr Maley issued a statement denying the allegations contained in the email and threatened legal action if they were repeated outside of parliamentary privilege.
Mr Gunner said Mr McCleary was the client at the heart of a series of 13 questions sent by the NT News to Mr Maley on Monday night that he would not answer.
He told Parliament Mr Maley resigned as a magistrate hours after receiving the questions.
The emails go over the history of a legal dispute Mr McCleary was involved in eight years ago concerning the pegging of mining claims south of Alice Springs over what is known as the Pamela and Angela Uranium prospects.
Mr Maley was his solicitor at the time.
The court ruled Mr McCleary could not assert ownership over the claim.
In the email read to Parliament, Mr McCleary asserted that officers in the Mines Department and the Labor administration at the time colluded to frustrate his efforts.
The miner made a Freedom of Information application for sensitive documents related to his case, but that application was rejected.
Mr Gunner quoted from an email Mr McCleary sent to Mr Giles in May, saying:
"In July 2008, I received a phone call from Peter Maley of Maley's Barristers and Solicitors.
"He stated he was ringing on behalf of the CLP and in particular Dave Tollner.
"He went on to state that he understood that the CLP was aware of what had occurred recently in regards to my pegging and application for mineral claims over the Pamela and Angela prospects.
"They were sympathetic in regards to what had occurred and that when they came to power I would be given the opportunity to review all files and documents relating to this matter.
"He also said that the CLP was in a bind, and was unable to raise enough funds for election advertising, and if I'd be prepared to contribute say $10,000 to help myself and the CLP.
"I agreed especially knowing that the CLP was sympathetic and intended to allow me access to the files so I would be able to understand what had occurred."
Mr McCleary's email said he made two payments to the CLP in July 2008: The first was for $5,174.40 and was paid to NT Broadcasters Pty Ltd; the second was for $4,825.60 and was made directly to the CLP.
Mr Gunner told Parliament the direct payment to the CLP was in the party's declaration of donations to the Australian and NT Electoral Commissions for that year.
The allegations made by the Shadow Attorney Shadow General, Michael Gunner, under parliamentary privilege are denied and untrue.
Former magistrate Peter Maley
"But what of the $5174.40 that's been paid to NT Broadcasters for CLP election advertising?" Mr Gunner asked.
"We've been unable to find any declaration of that amount and will be referring it to the NT and Australian Electoral Commissions for formal investigation."
After the CLP won the 2012 election, Mr McCleary made several attempts to contact Mr Tollner about the documents and said he wrote to Mr Maley in March 2013, after Mr Tollner became the deputy chief minister, and he assumed he was in a better position to deliver the documents.
He said he received this reply from Mr Maley:
"I agree, I'll give them a week to settle down, then I will contact Tollner."
Mr Gunner told Parliament Mr McCleary remained unsatisfied and wrote to Mr Giles in May.
"We know the Chief Minister is aware of this matter because he wrote back to Mr McCleary on the 25th of May after Mr McCleary had sent him a second email accusing the CLP of extorting the money from him," he said.
"That's three months ago. The Chief Minister responded to Mr McCleary yet in this house all week he's been playing dumb, telling us he had no knowledge of the issue that led to Mr Maley's resignation."
Mr Gunner read to Parliament what he said was the Chief Minister's reply:
"Thank you for your email Norm. I have flicked your email to Dave Tollner and he will get back to you. Please let me know if he doesn't make contact."
At that point Mr Gunner addressed Parliament directly.
"The complainant gave the money over on the promise of getting sensitive information from the new government that he had been hitherto been unable to get by normal channels," he said.
"The allegation by Mr McCleary is that the Member for Fong Lim [Mr Tollner] gave Mr Maley riding instructions to offer Mr McCleary a favour in return for a $10,000 donation."
Mr Gunner asked why Mr Giles had not taken the matter to police when they were first raised with him.
"The Chief Minister has known of this allegation since May and has done nothing about it. He should have immediately referred the matter to the Police Commissioner. His failure is even greater knowing he is also the Police Minister," he said.
"It is clear that the Chief Minister has failed to maintain the highest standards of probity that his office demands and the community expects."

No documents given to McCleary: Adam Giles

Mr Giles has since responded in a statement.
"The claims made by Mr McCleary refer to conversations he allegedly had with Mr Maley prior to the 2008 election, before I even entered Parliament," he said.
"Since becoming Chief Minister, no documents have ever been given to this man. Norm McCleary's main complaint in the correspondence tabled in Parliament is that, in fact, we refused to act illegally in handing over government files.
"We acted on advice from the Department of Mines and Energy who suggested that Mr McCleary was a serial complainer with no right to the documents and we should steer clear. That's exactly what we did.
"I have never met Norm McCleary [nor] spoken to him.
"I welcome the Electoral Commission looking into Mr McCleary's donation. What Peter Maley may have said to his client back in 2008 is a matter for him to explain."
Mr Maley has also issued a statement responding to the allegations made in Parliament:
"The allegations made by the Shadow Attorney-General, Michael Gunner, under Parliamentary Privilege are denied and untrue," he said.
"If Mr Gunner repeats these allegations outside of parliamentary privilege, I will take legal action against him."
First posted Thu at 10:18pm

Thursday, 21 August 2014

FOI Australian Public Service Commission/ APS Disclosure Log

So again I have requested the names of the people on the APSC Audit Committee.
The Audit Committee is a requirement under  the  Financial Management and Accountability Act. Its function is to ensure compliance.
The APSC FOI officer has determined that they will not disclose this information.
Clearly the only reason this information cannot be obtained under FOI is because the the APSC are aware this committee is shonky and dodgy and fails to live up to the function it was designed for.
Part of the functions of this audit committee is  to ensure the incompetent dodgy Commissioner Steve Sedgwick  complies with correctly investigating the complaints made against Commonwealth Agency Heads instead of FUCKING them all over as he has done in the  past. It is also a  requirement of the dodgy Commissioner to investigate complaints by WHISTLE BLOWERS and not fuck these over also or  get  Robert Cornall to fuck them over for him

Wednesday, 20 August 2014

Email to the DPP/ S474.17 Criminal Code



From: fionabrown01@hotmail.com
To: stephen.grodzicki@cdpp.gov.au
Subject: Notice of Motion
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 14:35:21 +1000

Dear Stephen,
I confirm I served a Notice of Motion and affidavit on the DPP today
I also confirm you said this matter was " complex" when we were last in court on the 6th August
so I refer to the further conduct of this matter.....
It is becoming abundantly clear that the proceedings cannot be maintained on the basis of the information before the court.
In addition, before the Magistrate the crown failed to apply the proper Tests as set out in  the decision of Monis V the Queen , Coleman V Power and Brett David Starkey
In addition it appears from a procedural fairness prospective the Crown’s case must fail as none of the witnesses who have executed statements have been able to substantiate the matters that  have been raised in their statements or  to produce  any evidence to underpin the statement of facts  or allegations that they claim. In addition  many of the allegations contained  in the statements are hearsay and totally unsupported and given that none of the  witnesses were allowed  to be called it appears extraordinary that the  court did not summarily dismiss the prosecution,
Accordingly I take this opportunity to  withdraw  the prosecution and consent  to orders quashing the conviction

I await your consideration

Yours Sincerely
Fiona Brown

Monday, 2 June 2014

NSW SES commissioner facing call to be sacked after ICAC finds him corrupt / Shonky Magistrate Lisa Stapleton accepts false statements/ AFSA

So ICAC found the SES for failing to investigate the corrupt conduct of Steven Pearce. Fortunately this is covered by state Legislation the body responsible for investigating this corrupt conduct is ICAC.
However if this department was covered by Commonwealth Legislation who would the complaint be made to????
Both Christine Milne and Senator Xenophon have both called for a Commonwealth Watchdog.
The only Commonwealth department available to complain to about systemic corrupt conduct and corruption in commonwealth Departments is the Commonwealth Ombudsman who is actively protecting atrocious behaviour. So effectively who will GUARD the Guards???
On friday I was sentenced to 18 month jail for exposing systemic corrupt conduct , corruption and protection of Fraud by the Australian Financial Security Authority( Bankruptcy)
The Magistrate said I had sullied the careers of Management at AFSA She found she did not have to consider if what I was exposing was correct and also found I did not have the right to cross examine shonky staff from AFSA including Adam Toma who has transferred to the Victorian Commission Gaming and Liquor Regulation. This shonk Magistrate said integrity was a very important aspect for this shonky Management that both the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Australian Public Service Commissioner protected.
Magistrate Stapleton also found it was highly offensive that I exposed this conduct on the internet............... clearly she must be joking.... if she fails to allow cross examination on the statements provided by Veronique Ingram Adam Toma Matthew Osborne etc from AFSA and she has been made aware that these statements are false though she has shown bias and accepted them into her judgement as being truthful where does this shonky Magistrate stand??
Why would a magistrate fail to show due process and bias when her integrity would be questioned?
Is Stapleton protecting some other agenda???.... or does she just KNOW that someone higher up will also protect her???


Commissioner of the NSW SES Murray Kear leaves the ICAC hearing in Sydney
Commissioner of the NSW SES Murray Kear leaves the ICAC / Picture: John GraingerSource: News Limited
STATE Emergency Services boss Murray Kear has been found to be corrupt by ICAC for failing to investigate the ­alleged corrupt conduct of his friend, Deputy Commissioner Steven Pearce.
The commission recommended the Commissioner be sacked but Police Minister Stuart Ayres said he would wait for legal advice before making a decision.
ICAC found former deputy commissioner Tara McCarthy was sacked after she raised concerns about Mr Pearce, telling Mr Kear the SES had entered into two dodgy contracts, that corporate credit cards were used to buy roof racks and electric brakes for Mr Pearce’s car, and that diary entries had been falsified.
ICAC found yesterday Mr Kear had failed to investigate the allegations “because of his friendship with Mr Pearce”.
The commission recommended: “The Minister for Police and Emergency Services should give consideration to taking action against Commissioner Kear for disciplinary offences of misconduct with a view to his dismissal.”
Ms McCarthy was dismissed on May 14 last year by Mr Kear, who said “he had lost trust and confidence in her”.
“The commission is satisfied that Commissioner Kear dismissed Ms McCarthy substantially because of the allegations she had made against Mr Pearce. In coming to that conclusion, the ICAC has considered that Ms McCarthy was performing satisfactory work at the time of her dismissal — acknowledged by Commissioner Kear,’’ ICAC said.
Mr Kear and Mr Pearce had known each other since 2006, when they worked at Fire and Rescue NSW.
Public Service Association general secretary Anne Gardiner said the government should reinstate Ms McCarthy, who blew the whistle on corrupt conduct at the SES.
“If the Baird government wants to demonstrate its commitment to transparency then Deputy Commissioner McCarthy should be immediately reinstated,’’ she said.
Mr Ayres said he would make a decision on Mr Kear’s sacking and Ms McCarthy’s ­­re-employment after he received legal advice.
“This is a serious matter and I am taking advice on the ­issues raised by the report and the courses of action available to me. While this takes place, Commissioner Kear remains on leave,” Mr Ayres said.
The ICAC also found Mr Kear did not disclose a conflict of interest when he appointed Mr Pearce to the SES or when Mr Pearce was made Deputy Commissioner.
ICAC found Mr Kear’s ­“approach of placing trust in a person he described as a ‘mate’, without undertaking any ­objective enquiry, is materially inconsistent with the notion of unbiased, objective decision-making. The entry into the contracts resulted in state funds being wasted.”

Saturday, 31 May 2014

David Harold Eastman/ Commonwealth Ombudsman / Veronique Ingram/ Guilty till proven inocent
So David Eastman worked for Treasury. If I recall correctly he had made complaints about treasury to the Australian Public Service and I think the Ombudsman. 
So how much did the court rely on the  the circumstantial evidence of people who claimed  Eastman told them he was going to kill the Commonwealth Ombudsman and applying the "Reasonable Persons'  Test did a reasonable person think this was possible  or he had the actual ability or in all accounts  was it merely a FIGURE of speech?
So what was David Eastman complaining about to these authorities?
Is also interesting that the shonky Veronique Ingram   Inspector General in Bankruptcy  who is currently protecting atrocious systemic corrupt conduct at ITSA or Afsa also worked for treasury.
There is an approximately 14 years difference between Eastman and Ingram so it is unclear if their  paths crossed!!!!
Was this all part of some conspiracy by the Federal Police to silence Eastman because of his complaints that had foundation??



It is now more than 25 years since Australian Federal Police Commissioner Colin Stanley Winchester was shot and killed as he arrived home from work at 9.15 pm on Tuesday 10 January 1989.
After a protracted police investigation and a trial that lasted 85 days, David Harold Eastman (now aged 69), was convicted of the murder in 1995.
The body of evidence was significant. Amongst it, revelations that ammunition residue found in the boot of Eastman’s car was indistinguishable from that found at the murder scene.
But the circumstantial evidence was also compelling. Several prominent people had come forward after the killing saying Eastman had told them he was going to kill Winchester (as well as a threat to kill the Commonwealth Ombudsman).
Eastman reportedly told Winchester this to his face because he would not withdraw an assault charge against him. A witness saw him staking out Winchester’s Deakin home in days prior to the shooting. The witness recalled the make and colour of car, but had the last digit wrong [the rest correct] from the number plate.
The jury was unanimous in finding him guilty and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by ACT Supreme Court Justice Ken Carruthers. This by and large should have been the end of the matter and the last we see of Eastman.
The exhaustive trial had given plenty of opportunity for the evidence to be publicly reported and room for speculation. Almost from the time of the investigation and arrest it was clear Eastman was a serial nuisance, a dangerous public pest and a combative and violent individual.
He regularly had blow-ups with various government agency staff members (gathering more than 200 alleged assault reports). He fought with his lawyers and sacked his defence team on any number of occasions.
Eastman, who is occasionally painted as ‘highly intelligent’ by the Fairfax media, simply had no other case to make – or surely he would have done so. He would not or could not say where he was on the night of the murder. And he could not – or would not – explain other evidence presented to the court.
Possibly out of this genesis grew a thread of doubt that he might be a victim of a miss-trial. Police pressure could have sent him over the top and prevented him from presenting a rational defence.
These arguments gained some credence as the years passed and as the murder event recedes from memory and as police and key players age and move on in their lives.
A small group of anonymous supporters has spent the years arguing Eastman’s cause from behind the scenes. It has brought forward doubts that evidence might be flawed (or even fabricated) and/or given undue (or unfair) weight. The Fairfax media in particular has given a mostly sympathetic voice for the Eastman cause, and it has nurtured the idea that he may well (despite everything) be an innocent man.
On 3 September 2012 this background chorus of support paid off for Eastman when the Hon Justice Shane Marshall ordered an Inquiry into the conviction. The inquiry has now completed its hearings (on 15 May 2014).  The inquiry has its own Eastman Inquiry website.
Many readers of Fairfax newspapers were not born when Winchester was gunned down 25 years ago. They can be forgiven for giving credence to the long-running counter-argument that a Mafia hit man gunned the commissioner down as pay-back for a bungled marijuana deal.
It is difficult to imagine what this process has cost the public purse.  The investigation and court case alone lasted around five years. Since then his cause has re-emerged time and again, driven by a handful of well-meaning but more possibly misguided supporters.
Postscript: To obtain further insights read Justice Michael Adams sues over evidence claim (The Australian 7 June 2013). Justice Adam’s claim has not been reported in the Fairfax media.

Monday, 6 January 2014

ANAO Better practice Guide

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Leadership and Culture
  • 3. Legislation, Policy and Governance
  • 4. Fraud Control Strategies—Overview
  • 5. Fraud Control—Prevention
  • 6. Fraud Control—Detection
  • 7. Fraud Control—Response
  • 8. Fraud Control—Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
  • 9. Identity Fraud—an Emerging Fraud Risk
  • Case Studies
  • Appendices
  • Quick reference card




  • 7.1. Fraud investigation

    The purpose of a fraud investigation is to gather evidence relating to specific fraud allegations to determine the facts relating to the matter and to assist in deciding what, if any, action should be taken in relation to the matter(s). Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities are required to investigate routine or minor instances of fraud against entity programs and to document the reasons for their decisions, irrespective of whether the initial assessment results in the matter being referred for a criminal investigation. ‘Routine or minor’ is defined as instances of fraud that, on an initial assessment by the entity, would be unlikely to be accepted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) under its Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model (see section 7.1.1).
    Because the investigation process must give due consideration to a broad range of legislative, policy and practical considerations, such as sufficient evidence to support the prosecution of a criminal charge in a court of law,relevent entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers.

    7.1.1. AFP referrals and assistance

    The Fraud Control Guidelines stipulate that the AFP has primary responsibility for investigating serious or complex fraud against the Commonwealth. Relevant entities must refer all instances of potential serious or complex fraud offences to the AFP in accordance with the AGIS and AFP referral process published on the AFP’s website.[46] The AFP will review the referral in line with the AFP Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model and may subsequently undertake an investigation into the matter, or reject the referral, undertake a joint investigation with the entity.
    Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities that have the capacity and the appropriate skills and resources needed to investigate criminal matters and meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) in gathering evidence and preparing briefs of evidence are authorised to investigate serious or complex offences against the Commonwealth.
    Entities can request AFP assistance or advice in relation to an investigation being conducted by that entity into a suspected fraud matter. The AFP can assist entities with the conduct of search warrants, and can provide the following services to support an investigation:
    • forensic services;
    • document examination;
    • fingerprint analysis;
    • DNA;
    • ballistic testing; and
    • computer forensics.
    Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities that have the capacity and the appropriate skills and resources needed to investigate criminal matters and meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) in gathering evidence and preparing briefs of evidence are authorised to investigate serious or complex offences against the Commonwealth.

    7.1.2. Australian Government Investigations Standards

    All Australian Government entities that are required to comply with the Fraud Control Guidelines must also comply with the minimum standards for investigations set out in the Australian Government Investigations Standards (AGIS).[47] The AGIS establishes the minimum standards for relevant Australian government entities when they conduct investigations. Should the AGIS be in conflict with legislation, the legislative requirement prevails.
    An investigation is a project seeking information relevant to an alleged, apparent or potential breach of the law. The primary purpose of an investigation is to gather admissible evidence for any subsequent action, whether under criminal, civil penalty, civil, disciplinary or administrative sanctions. Investigations can also result in disruption or prevention action being taken by entities.
    The AGIS is applicable to investigations where an entity determines there are reasonable grounds to suspect non-compliance, involve a conflict of interest or if the seriousness or complexity of the matter requires application of these standards. The term ‘investigation’ can also include intelligence processes which directly support the gathering of admissible evidence. The AGIS applies to all stages of an investigation.
    According to the AGIS, the outcome of an investigation does not distinguish between administrative, criminal or civil action and is not a factor in determining the quality of the investigation. Rather, what is important are the standards applied during an investigation and the capacity of the investigative process to withstand administrative, operational and judicial review.
    Relevant entities are required to comply with the AGIS to achieve a uniformly high standard of investigation by:
    • having up-to-date policies and procedures relevant to their functions and programs and an investigation management system, and file management and activity recording procedures in place;
    • complying with the AGIS definition of an investigation and the related primary purpose for gathering admissible evidence for subsequent action;
    • documenting their policies and procedures for handling all aspects of the investigation process consistent with the AGIS, from initial consideration of an allegation through to successful prosecution of fraudulent crime and recovery of criminal proceeds; and
    • clearly identifying the different investigation methodologies for administrative and criminal investigations and the decision-making in relation to the transition from regulatory / compliance functions to criminal investigation.

    7.1.3. Identification of fraudulent behaviour

    The Fraud Control Guidelines require relevant entities to have information systems in place, appropriate for the number and complexity of investigations undertaken, in order to manage information gathered about fraud. This not only supports sound decision-making at the management level, but also helps entities to identify and address any systemic issues that are relevant to fraud.
    It is good practice for an organisation to record every allegation of fraudulent conduct that is reported to it, preferably in a central database. This enables proactive analysis of potential fraud hot spots and it can be used to direct the activities of internal audit. A central database also enables trends and analysis of fraud types to be undertaken and profiles to be developed based on systemic types of fraud cases.
    According to the Australian Standard AS 8001-2008 Fraud and Corruption Control, a fraud incident register should include:
    • date and time of report;
    • date and time of incident detection;
    • how the incident was reported to management (anonymous report, line management etc);
    • nature of the incident;
    • value of the loss to the entity (if any); and
    • action taken following detection.
    Such a register can be used to facilitate an organisation’s policy for the reporting, analysis and escalation of all detected incidences of fraud and corruption. This policy should be clear on the actions to be undertaken following the reporting of an incident.

    Case Study

    FaHCSIA fraud response governance model

    The Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) recently established a working group between its Fraud and Compliance Branch and People Branch. The working group meets on a weekly basis to discuss allegations of ‘unethical conduct’, particularly in relation to fraud matters. The working group aims to ensure that all allegations are investigated by the most appropriate party within FaHCSIA to enable the best outcome for the department.
    The working group also allows the two branches to identify and discuss potential hot spots and analyse trends with a view to improving education and awareness-raising for employees in the department. The two branches have also developed a complementary suite of reports in relation to matters that are considered by FaHCSIA’s Compliance and Integrity Committee.

    7.1.4. Preliminary case assessment of an allegation of fraud

    The AGIS outlines the standards required of relevant entities when receiving and dealing with an allegation of fraud and all investigations are to be conducted in accordance with the AGIS. Upon receiving an allegation of fraudulent conduct, a relevant entity needs to consider what should be the appropriate response.
    Under the AGIS, a relevant entity must have a procedure covering the initial consideration of a fraud allegation that includes:
    • recording of the allegation in an appropriately secure fraud incident register, file and/or electronic case management system, consistent with the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework;
    • the person responsible for making the initial assessment (the decision-maker) is appropriately trained, as required by the Fraud Control Guidelines, and the entity provides an appropriate level of managerial oversight of decision-making;
    • timeframes for initial consideration of the allegation;
    • the obtaining of any readily accessible evidentiary information from within the entity, where the collection of such evidence would not jeopardise any future investigation, to allow an informed decision on the type of further action required; and
    • the need to document the reasons for the decision and what action is intended. The decision as to how to respond to an allegation of fraud is considered to be a ‘critical decision’ in the fraud investigation process and one which needs to be appropriately documented.[48]
    An entity may also make use of a Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model (CCPM). This tool aids the decision-maker in making the initial assessment and helps drive transparency and consistency in decision-making. The AFP utilises a CCPM for matters referred from other organisations, and entities can consider adapting the principles in this model for their own decision-making purposes.
    As provided under the AGIS, it may be that a preliminary inquiry, or ‘case assessment’, is required before a decision can be made as to how to proceed with the allegation. An initial case assessment is aimed at gaining sufficient information to be able to determine the subsequent appropriate action and could include: an interview of the complainant; some level of financial analysis to identify the potential veracity of the allegation; and such other preliminary steps as necessary to enable the decision to be made.
    Relevant entities should ensure that in undertaking any preliminary inquiry, they comply with the AGIS and any entity direction or protocols relating to the handling of allegations of fraud, including those relating to the use of coercive powers to collect evidence. Agencies need to provide clear guidance to their investigators about the use of coercive powers particularly once fraudulent behaviour is suspected and the investigation becomes a criminal investigation.
    It should also be noted that, irrespective of whether the decision is made to undertake a criminal or disciplinary investigation, the AGIS standards of investigation must be maintained to allow for the possibility of the allegation becoming more appropriate for criminal investigation. As such, relevent entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers. (see section 7.1.6).

    7.1.5. Conducting an investigation

    Fraud investigations are conducted to determine the facts relating to specific allegations of fraud, through the collection and examination of evidence. The AGIS provides guidance and better practice investigation and case management standards for all investigations. Relevant entities must have in place processes and procedures that are consistent with, or exceed, the model procedures outlined in the AGIS modules.[49]
    For example, relevant entities must have written procedures regarding:
    • the process for taking witness statements and conducting interviews with suspects;
    • the handling of all physical evidence, including property seizure records, and the storage and disposal of exhibits (there should also be written procedures addressing the audit of the exhibit register as required by the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework);
    • the conduct of surveillance, including physical and electronic;
    • the management of human information sources (also referred to as informants); and
    • the use of legislated powers such as the power of arrest, detention, coercion, search warrant execution, production orders and inspection orders.
    Investigators must have knowledge of and the ability to apply the principles and elements of their entity’s standards and written procedures.
    A fraud investigation and response decision-making process is represented at Figure 7.1. This decision tree has been developed to provide an explanation of, and guidance through, the fraud investigation and response process.
    This diagram should not be used as a substitute for the AGIS but rather as a guide to better understand the critical decisions that need to be made and documented, from the initial assessment of the allegation and throughout the fraud investigation and response process.

    Outsourcing investigations

    In some instances, relevant entities will not be sufficiently resourced to conduct an internal investigative response to allegations of fraud. The establishment of an internal fraud investigations team can be costly and takes time to implement effectively. This will not be an issue for the larger program delivery and customer service entities, but for smaller entities (or entities which traditionally focus on policy development), the most cost-effective option will be to engage external investigations services.
    In outsourcing investigation activities, relevant entities must take into account the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for investigation service providers (see section 7.1.6). It is also beneficial if providers have demonstrated experience in conducting fraud investigations in an Australian government context, and are sufficiently familiar with the requirements of the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS.
    Notwithstanding an entity’s resource constraints with respect to internal fraud response capabilities, all serious and complex fraud matters should be referred to the AFP in the first instance. In addition, a relevant entity must consider whether it may still require support from the AFP in the form of assistance to execute search warrants or in the provision of forensic services (see section 7.1.1).
    Figure 7.1: Fraud investigation and response decision tree
    Figure 7.1: Fraud investigation and response decision treeSource: KPMG.
    [Click image above to open larger version in a new window

    7.1.6. Training requirements

    In deciding to undertake a fraud investigation, relevant entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers.
    The Public Services Training Package PSP04 offers the following qualifications relevant to fraud investigations:
    • a Certificate IV in Government (Investigation) for employees or contractors primarily engaged in the investigation of fraud; and
    • a Diploma of Government (Investigation) for employees contractors primarily engaged in the coordination and conduct of fraud control investigations.
    In addition to appropriate qualifications, a robust internal investigations team should have a good mix of skills and experience. Depending on the needs of the entity an investigations team could include: ex-law enforcement officers; lawyers; intelligence operatives; forensic accountants; Information Technology experts, and subject matter experts for the types of programs and services delivered by the entity (for example, building surveyors, engineers or social workers).
    .










    Image: Thumbnail of Report Cover
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Leadership and Culture
  • 3. Legislation, Policy and Governance
  • 4. Fraud Control Strategies—Overview
  • 5. Fraud Control—Prevention
  • 6. Fraud Control—Detection
  • 7. Fraud Control—Response
  • 8. Fraud Control—Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
  • 9. Identity Fraud—an Emerging Fraud Risk
  • Case Studies
  • Appendices
  • Quick reference card




  • 7.1. Fraud investigation

    The purpose of a fraud investigation is to gather evidence relating to specific fraud allegations to determine the facts relating to the matter and to assist in deciding what, if any, action should be taken in relation to the matter(s). Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities are required to investigate routine or minor instances of fraud against entity programs and to document the reasons for their decisions, irrespective of whether the initial assessment results in the matter being referred for a criminal investigation. ‘Routine or minor’ is defined as instances of fraud that, on an initial assessment by the entity, would be unlikely to be accepted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) under its Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model (see section 7.1.1).
    Because the investigation process must give due consideration to a broad range of legislative, policy and practical considerations, such as sufficient evidence to support the prosecution of a criminal charge in a court of law,relevent entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers.

    7.1.1. AFP referrals and assistance

    The Fraud Control Guidelines stipulate that the AFP has primary responsibility for investigating serious or complex fraud against the Commonwealth. Relevant entities must refer all instances of potential serious or complex fraud offences to the AFP in accordance with the AGIS and AFP referral process published on the AFP’s website.[46] The AFP will review the referral in line with the AFP Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model and may subsequently undertake an investigation into the matter, or reject the referral, undertake a joint investigation with the entity.
    Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities that have the capacity and the appropriate skills and resources needed to investigate criminal matters and meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) in gathering evidence and preparing briefs of evidence are authorised to investigate serious or complex offences against the Commonwealth.
    Entities can request AFP assistance or advice in relation to an investigation being conducted by that entity into a suspected fraud matter. The AFP can assist entities with the conduct of search warrants, and can provide the following services to support an investigation:
    • forensic services;
    • document examination;
    • fingerprint analysis;
    • DNA;
    • ballistic testing; and
    • computer forensics.
    Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities that have the capacity and the appropriate skills and resources needed to investigate criminal matters and meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) in gathering evidence and preparing briefs of evidence are authorised to investigate serious or complex offences against the Commonwealth.

    7.1.2. Australian Government Investigations Standards

    All Australian Government entities that are required to comply with the Fraud Control Guidelines must also comply with the minimum standards for investigations set out in the Australian Government Investigations Standards (AGIS).[47] The AGIS establishes the minimum standards for relevant Australian government entities when they conduct investigations. Should the AGIS be in conflict with legislation, the legislative requirement prevails.
    An investigation is a project seeking information relevant to an alleged, apparent or potential breach of the law. The primary purpose of an investigation is to gather admissible evidence for any subsequent action, whether under criminal, civil penalty, civil, disciplinary or administrative sanctions. Investigations can also result in disruption or prevention action being taken by entities.
    The AGIS is applicable to investigations where an entity determines there are reasonable grounds to suspect non-compliance, involve a conflict of interest or if the seriousness or complexity of the matter requires application of these standards. The term ‘investigation’ can also include intelligence processes which directly support the gathering of admissible evidence. The AGIS applies to all stages of an investigation.
    According to the AGIS, the outcome of an investigation does not distinguish between administrative, criminal or civil action and is not a factor in determining the quality of the investigation. Rather, what is important are the standards applied during an investigation and the capacity of the investigative process to withstand administrative, operational and judicial review.
    Relevant entities are required to comply with the AGIS to achieve a uniformly high standard of investigation by:
    • having up-to-date policies and procedures relevant to their functions and programs and an investigation management system, and file management and activity recording procedures in place;
    • complying with the AGIS definition of an investigation and the related primary purpose for gathering admissible evidence for subsequent action;
    • documenting their policies and procedures for handling all aspects of the investigation process consistent with the AGIS, from initial consideration of an allegation through to successful prosecution of fraudulent crime and recovery of criminal proceeds; and
    • clearly identifying the different investigation methodologies for administrative and criminal investigations and the decision-making in relation to the transition from regulatory / compliance functions to criminal investigation.

    7.1.3. Identification of fraudulent behaviour

    The Fraud Control Guidelines require relevant entities to have information systems in place, appropriate for the number and complexity of investigations undertaken, in order to manage information gathered about fraud. This not only supports sound decision-making at the management level, but also helps entities to identify and address any systemic issues that are relevant to fraud.
    It is good practice for an organisation to record every allegation of fraudulent conduct that is reported to it, preferably in a central database. This enables proactive analysis of potential fraud hot spots and it can be used to direct the activities of internal audit. A central database also enables trends and analysis of fraud types to be undertaken and profiles to be developed based on systemic types of fraud cases.
    According to the Australian Standard AS 8001-2008 Fraud and Corruption Control, a fraud incident register should include:
    • date and time of report;
    • date and time of incident detection;
    • how the incident was reported to management (anonymous report, line management etc);
    • nature of the incident;
    • value of the loss to the entity (if any); and
    • action taken following detection.
    Such a register can be used to facilitate an organisation’s policy for the reporting, analysis and escalation of all detected incidences of fraud and corruption. This policy should be clear on the actions to be undertaken following the reporting of an incident.

    Case Study

    FaHCSIA fraud response governance model

    The Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) recently established a working group between its Fraud and Compliance Branch and People Branch. The working group meets on a weekly basis to discuss allegations of ‘unethical conduct’, particularly in relation to fraud matters. The working group aims to ensure that all allegations are investigated by the most appropriate party within FaHCSIA to enable the best outcome for the department.
    The working group also allows the two branches to identify and discuss potential hot spots and analyse trends with a view to improving education and awareness-raising for employees in the department. The two branches have also developed a complementary suite of reports in relation to matters that are considered by FaHCSIA’s Compliance and Integrity Committee.

    7.1.4. Preliminary case assessment of an allegation of fraud

    The AGIS outlines the standards required of relevant entities when receiving and dealing with an allegation of fraud and all investigations are to be conducted in accordance with the AGIS. Upon receiving an allegation of fraudulent conduct, a relevant entity needs to consider what should be the appropriate response.
    Under the AGIS, a relevant entity must have a procedure covering the initial consideration of a fraud allegation that includes:
    • recording of the allegation in an appropriately secure fraud incident register, file and/or electronic case management system, consistent with the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework;
    • the person responsible for making the initial assessment (the decision-maker) is appropriately trained, as required by the Fraud Control Guidelines, and the entity provides an appropriate level of managerial oversight of decision-making;
    • timeframes for initial consideration of the allegation;
    • the obtaining of any readily accessible evidentiary information from within the entity, where the collection of such evidence would not jeopardise any future investigation, to allow an informed decision on the type of further action required; and
    • the need to document the reasons for the decision and what action is intended. The decision as to how to respond to an allegation of fraud is considered to be a ‘critical decision’ in the fraud investigation process and one which needs to be appropriately documented.[48]
    An entity may also make use of a Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model (CCPM). This tool aids the decision-maker in making the initial assessment and helps drive transparency and consistency in decision-making. The AFP utilises a CCPM for matters referred from other organisations, and entities can consider adapting the principles in this model for their own decision-making purposes.
    As provided under the AGIS, it may be that a preliminary inquiry, or ‘case assessment’, is required before a decision can be made as to how to proceed with the allegation. An initial case assessment is aimed at gaining sufficient information to be able to determine the subsequent appropriate action and could include: an interview of the complainant; some level of financial analysis to identify the potential veracity of the allegation; and such other preliminary steps as necessary to enable the decision to be made.
    Relevant entities should ensure that in undertaking any preliminary inquiry, they comply with the AGIS and any entity direction or protocols relating to the handling of allegations of fraud, including those relating to the use of coercive powers to collect evidence. Agencies need to provide clear guidance to their investigators about the use of coercive powers particularly once fraudulent behaviour is suspected and the investigation becomes a criminal investigation.
    It should also be noted that, irrespective of whether the decision is made to undertake a criminal or disciplinary investigation, the AGIS standards of investigation must be maintained to allow for the possibility of the allegation becoming more appropriate for criminal investigation. As such, relevent entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers. (see section 7.1.6).

    7.1.5. Conducting an investigation

    Fraud investigations are conducted to determine the facts relating to specific allegations of fraud, through the collection and examination of evidence. The AGIS provides guidance and better practice investigation and case management standards for all investigations. Relevant entities must have in place processes and procedures that are consistent with, or exceed, the model procedures outlined in the AGIS modules.[49]
    For example, relevant entities must have written procedures regarding:
    • the process for taking witness statements and conducting interviews with suspects;
    • the handling of all physical evidence, including property seizure records, and the storage and disposal of exhibits (there should also be written procedures addressing the audit of the exhibit register as required by the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework);
    • the conduct of surveillance, including physical and electronic;
    • the management of human information sources (also referred to as informants); and
    • the use of legislated powers such as the power of arrest, detention, coercion, search warrant execution, production orders and inspection orders.
    Investigators must have knowledge of and the ability to apply the principles and elements of their entity’s standards and written procedures.
    A fraud investigation and response decision-making process is represented at Figure 7.1. This decision tree has been developed to provide an explanation of, and guidance through, the fraud investigation and response process.
    This diagram should not be used as a substitute for the AGIS but rather as a guide to better understand the critical decisions that need to be made and documented, from the initial assessment of the allegation and throughout the fraud investigation and response process.

    Outsourcing investigations

    In some instances, relevant entities will not be sufficiently resourced to conduct an internal investigative response to allegations of fraud. The establishment of an internal fraud investigations team can be costly and takes time to implement effectively. This will not be an issue for the larger program delivery and customer service entities, but for smaller entities (or entities which traditionally focus on policy development), the most cost-effective option will be to engage external investigations services.
    In outsourcing investigation activities, relevant entities must take into account the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for investigation service providers (see section 7.1.6). It is also beneficial if providers have demonstrated experience in conducting fraud investigations in an Australian government context, and are sufficiently familiar with the requirements of the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS.
    Notwithstanding an entity’s resource constraints with respect to internal fraud response capabilities, all serious and complex fraud matters should be referred to the AFP in the first instance. In addition, a relevant entity must consider whether it may still require support from the AFP in the form of assistance to execute search warrants or in the provision of forensic services (see section 7.1.1).
    Figure 7.1: Fraud investigation and response decision tree
    Figure 7.1: Fraud investigation and response decision tree Source: KPMG.
    [Click image above to open larger version in a new window

    7.1.6. Training requirements

    In deciding to undertake a fraud investigation, relevant entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers.
    The Public Services Training Package PSP04 offers the following qualifications relevant to fraud investigations:
    • a Certificate IV in Government (Investigation) for employees or contractors primarily engaged in the investigation of fraud; and
    • a Diploma of Government (Investigation) for employees contractors primarily engaged in the coordination and conduct of fraud control investigations.
    In addition to appropriate qualifications, a robust internal investigations team should have a good mix of skills and experience. Depending on the needs of the entity an investigations team could include: ex-law enforcement officers; lawyers; intelligence operatives; forensic accountants; Information Technology experts, and subject matter experts for the types of programs and services delivered by the entity (for example, building surveyors, engineers or social workers).

    [46]. Referring matters to the AFP: <www.afp.gov.au/what-we-do/referrals.aspx#initial>.
    [47]. At the time that this Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities—was being prepared and published by the ANAO, the AGIS was being updated to reflect experience since it was issued in 2003. While the references to investigation standards in this Better Practice Guide reflect the essence of the revised AGIS, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) plans to provide the revised AGIS on-line and, if appropriate, to modify the standards from time to time. Given the specialised nature of fraud investigations, entities should consult the AFP’s website to ensure the currency of their overall approach to the investigation of fraud and to inform their investigation activities.
    [48]. Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government Investigation Standards, AGD, Canberra, September 2003, Chapter 3.
    [49]. Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government Investigation Standards, AGD, Canberra, September 2003, Chapter 4.